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The 1980s have witnessed a strong revival of interest 
in the role of the State in the economic development 
of the Third World in general. In the case of Latin 
America, the debate has centered on the question of 
the role of the State in strategies for overcoming the 
imbalances and other factors holding back develop-
ment. In the course of this debate, however, several 
related but distinct sets of issues have become inter-
mixed in a manner which has proved to be highly 
unproductive. These issues must therefore be disen-
tangled before sense can be made of the debate. 
In undertaking this analysis, the authors start 
out by clarifying the characteristics of two different 
development strategies (import substitution and an 
export orientation) and the role of the State in each. 
In order to give the analysis a more concrete dimen-
sion they compare the experiences of some East 
Asian countries with those of Latin America. In so 
doing, they bring out the differences between the 
contents of these strategies and between the underly-
ing social and political structures which made them 
possible. 
The second half of the article is devoted to a 
critical assessment of the orthodox prescription of 
structural adjustment and of the main obstacles it 
faces and to a presentation of the principal features 
of an alternative proposal based on the concept of an 
"inclusionary" (as opposed to "exclusionary") type 
of development. 
•The authors are, respectively, Professor of Govern-
ment at the University of Essex, United Kingdom, and 
Professor at the Institute of Development Studies at the 
University of Sussex, United Kingdom. The article is based 
on a book by Anglade and Fortin (1985, forthcoming) 
which presents case studies often Latin American countries 
(Argentina.Molivia, Brazil, Chile, G)lombia, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) which together 
account for 89% of the population and 94% of the gross 





In the past few years a persistent controversy has 
surrounded the relative merits of, and the rela-
tions between, two development strategies: the 
strategy based on import-substitution industrial-
ization (ISI) and the strategy based on an export 
orientation (EO). For the past decade, interna-
tional financial institutions as well as interna-
tional private banks have criticized the 
debt-ridden Latin American countries for their 
inadequate export performance. The message is 
that these countries should embark fully upon an 
export-oriented model of growth and accumula-
tion, which they have pursued only partially so 
far. The success of the East Asian newly indus-
trializing countries (NICs), which have geared 
their whole economies towards exports, is held 
up as conclusive proof of the advantages of 
export orientation. To win back their constantly 
shrinking creditworthiness, the Latin American 
countries are advised to increase the share of 
exports in their GNP from their current 10%-
20% average to the 30%-35% average of the 
East Asian NICs. This would require a funda-
mental shift in government policies away from 
ISI strategies that impose damaging restrictions 
on international trade through both tariff and 
non-tariff barriers and, most particularly, 
through overvalued exchange rates. 
At this point in the debate, however, a differ-
ent set of issues, having to do with the role of the 
State in the management of the economy, is 
introduced. Albeit in varying degrees, defenders 
of export orientation attribute the failure of the 
Latin American countries to carry out such a 
strategy to excessive State intervention in the 
economy.1 State interference is accused of being 
particularly damaging in three areas: 1) interna-
tional trade, through the introduction of restric-
'A general statement of this view, which is not restricted to 
the Latin American case, but which nonetheless recognizes that 
export orientation is compatible with varying degrees of State 
intervention, is provided by Krueger (1984). A more uncomprom-
ising version, applied to the African case, is contained in Balassa 
(1984). 
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tions that tend to "isolate" the economy and 
"close" it off from the rest of the world; 2) inter-
nal pricing, through the introduction of rigidi-
ties in factor and product markets and the 
general disruption of relative prices resulting 
from high inflation, which is in turn the product 
of undisciplined fiscal, monetary and wage poli-
cies; and 3) direct production, through the estab-
lishment of inefficient and subsidized State 
enterprises, whose own prices are kept artifically 
low and which thus become a major source of 
budget deficits. All these factors are said to 
account for an "inward orientation" in develop-
ment strategy which is inherently inefficient and 
detrimental to true development. The policy 
recommendation is for the State to withdraw 
from the market, lift all restrictions to interna-
tional trade, as well as internal rigidities, and use 
its policy instruments to curb inflation and pro-
mote export orientation through the introduc-
tion of "realistic" exchange rates, i.e., 
devaluation. 
Based on the preceding summary, several 
confusions and errors in this analysis of the Latin 
American crisis can be identified. Firstly, while 
the argument is couched in terms of export 
orientation in general, it seems clear that it ref-
ers basically to the export of manufactured pro-
ducts. This is, of course, the case with the East 
Asian NICs which are held up as models. In 
addition, the theoretical rationale that is offered 
emphasizes the productivity gains stemming 
from technological progress, in turn a response 
to higher wages and reduced profits.2 While 
notions such as short-run comparative advan-
tages, international competitiveness, the easing 
of foreign exchange bottlenecks and an increased 
ability to attract foreign loans and investment 
are also present, the theoretical underpinnings 
of the argument seem to refer more to a dynamic 
process of industrialization than to an export 
orientation per se. 
Secondly, ISI and EO are not necessarily con-
tradictory strategies. Three points are relevant 
here: i) it is true that a policy of complete ISI 
raises difficult issues as regards the alternative 
costs and uses of the surplus in terms of export 
promotion; if pursued single-mindedly, it would 
2I.ittle (1982); Baiassa (1982). A good discussion of these 
views is found in Fransman (1984). 
direct accumulation to the production, in succes-
sion, of all industrial goods previously imported, 
therefore precluding accumulation in export 
industries. However, such an autarkic approach 
is hard to find in the real world, whereas it is 
clearly possible to design policies which combine 
protection for the local market with stimuli for 
other sectors of industry producing for export;3 
ii) certain types of ISI strategies can lay the 
groundwork for subsequent export drives; thus, 
the two can be successive phases of a policy, as 
the experience of the East Asian NICs, to be 
discussed below, clearly shows; iii) ISI does not 
necessarily entail a reduction of imports. In peri-
pheral capitalist economies, in fact, ISI often 
leads to an increase in the volume of imports; the 
difference is that their composition changes 
from consumer goods to intermediate and capi-
tal goods. It is therefore perfectly compatible 
with an increase in foreign trade, of which 
export promotion can be another component. 
Thirdly, and most important for the pur-
poses of this discussion, export orientation does 
not appear to be a function of the State's with-
drawal from the market. A wide range of con-
temporary research on the East Asian economies 
has shown that in these cases the State has been 
heavily interventionist and has used the full 
array of measures at its disposal to regulate the 
market , control impor t s and organize 
production.4 
To understand why the East Asian NICs 
have been more successful than the Latin Ameri-
can NICs, we must therefore go beyond the cur-
rent myths and oversimplifications and identify 
the key policy differences between the two mod-
els based on a political economy approach which 
emphasizes the constantly changing relations 
between the State and civil society. The argu-
ment presented in this article is that State inter-
vention has been a determinant in both the Latin 
American and the East Asian NICs, but that the 
scope and impact of this intervention have been 
different because, following the Second World 
War, the autonomy of State action vis-a-vis civil 
'The main objection made to this solution by supporters of 
export-oriented strategies is not theoretical but practical, and 
relates to the difficulties of administering a system of differential 
trade inducements. See Krueger (1984). 
4See Fajnzylber (1981); Evans and Alizadeh (1984);Schmitz 
(1984); Hamilton (1983), (1984); Moore (1984); Wade (1984); 
Westphal (1978); Amsden (1985); Kuznets (1977). 
THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICAS STRATEGIC OPTIONS / Ch. Anglade and C. Forth 213 
society was greater in East Asia than in Latin 
America. Why that was the case and what the 
The East Asian model of export-oriented devel-
opment is exemplified by the "gang of four" 
(South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singa-
pore). For the purposes of this article, only the 
first two cases will be examined, as the city-State 
nature of the other two does not allow for a 
meaningful comparison with any Latin Ameri-
can country. 
1. Land ownership, income 
distribution and industrialization 
Both South Korea (hereafter Korea) and Taiwan 
began their industrialization in the postwar 
period, after the military defeat of Japan made it 
possible for them to gain independence. As 
"late-late comers" to industrialization, they 
should have had a more difficult time than many 
Latin American countries, whose industrializa-
tion process had started considerably earlier. 
They had, however, a fundamental advantage, in 
that their distribution of income and composi-
tion of demand in the relevant period were con-
siderably less unequal than in Latin America 
—so much so that they exhibited patterns of 
household income distribution more in line with 
the advanced capitalist countries than with the 
Third World, s 
As repeatedly noted in the available litera-
ture, this was a consequence of the agrarian 
policies pursued both by the Japanese colonial 
government in the first part of the twentieth 
century and by the United States-influenced 
Korean and Taiwanese governments after 
1945.6 The result of these policies was first to 
'See Adelman arid Robinson (1978); Fei, Ranis and Kuo 
(1978); Rao ( 1978); Kuo ( 1984); Kuznets ( 1977); Amsden ( 1985). 
úSee Koo (1968); Kuznets (1977); Ho (1971); Hamilton 
(1983); Amsden (1985). 
consequences were is the subject of the brief 
comparison presented in the next section. 
weaken and then to eliminate the landowning 
class and to establish a pattern to peasant owner-
ship of small holdings which was to have a 
crucial impact on income distribution. In order 
to make agriculture more productive, the Japa-
nese annexed land on a large scale in Korea; in 
Taiwan, they expropriated the large holdings of 
absentee landlords, distributed their land to the 
holders of secondary titles and abolished sub-
tenancy.7 
However, the landowning class was not des-
troyed by Japanese colonial rule, and classical 
instances of collaboration frequently occurred. 
This, together with the high rents paid by 
tenants, explains the strong anti-landlord move-
ments which developed immediately after inde-
pendence, particularly in Korea.8 The United 
States military government, which started shar-
ing power with the interim nationalist govern-
ment of Syngman Rhee after the Japanese 
surrender, soon became so concerned with the 
growing communist influence in the anti-
landlord movement that, after some hesitation, 
it decided to proceed with land reform; in 1948 it 
bypassed the veto of the landlord-dominated 
Interim Assembly and started distributing to 
tenants' government holdings seized from the 
Japanese. Over 90% of the land previously 
owned by the Japanese was distributed among 
about one-quarter of Korea's farm population.9 
With the Korean conflict giving renewed influ-
ence to the United States, successive land reform 
acts were implemented which virtually elimi-
nated tenancy, and distributed all landholdings 
of over three hectares to the former tenants, 
'Kuznets (1977), pp. 16-17; Koo (1968). p. 12; Hamilton 
(1983), P-38. 
"Hamilton (1983), p. 42. 
'Kuznets (1977), p. 31. 
II 
Industrialization and the State: 
A comparison between East Asia 
and Latin America 
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while the landlords received nominal compensa-
tion in bonds.10 The impact on land tenure was 
striking. "Before..., 19% of farmers owned 90% 
of all land and more than 50% of farmers were 
landless peasants. Afterwards, 69% of the 
farmers owned all the land on which they 
worked, 24% were part-owners and only 7% 
were tenants."" 
The same process could be observed in Tai-
wan, where land reform was also introduced by 
stages after 1948. This was done first through a 
reduction of farm rent and the security of 
tenancy; then, as in Korea, through the sale of 
public land that had been taken over from Japa-
nese owners in 1945 and which was then made 
available in small plots to peasant families, who 
were granted generous payment facilities. 
Finally, the 1953 "land-to-the-tiller" act 
involved the compulsory purchase of all land-
holdings of over three hectares, with compensa-
tion in bonds; the land was then distributed to 
peasants, who could purchase it by small instal-
ments over a term of ten years.12 As a result of 
those reforms, "by 1973, almost 80% of the 
agricultural population consisted of owner-
cultivators and another tenth of part-owners. 
Only 6% of farm income accrued to landlords 
and money lenders".13 Moreover, by 1956 most 
peasant families already owned less than three 
hectares (93%), and there were nolandholdings 
over 10 hectares.14 
Like Japan, Korea and Taiwan thus deve-
loped a low land/man ratio. Contrary to the 
classical assumption that a division of farmland 
into smaller units causes a decline in productiv-
ity, in both countries it led to productivity 
increases and to annual rates of growth in agri-
cultural output in excess of 4 % per year in Korea 
l0Adelman and Robinson (1978), p. 39. 
"World Bank data quoted by Paukert, Skolka and Maton 
(1981), p. 39. 
,2Koo (1968), p. 38. 
'»Amsden (1985), p. 85. 
14Koo (1968), p. 41, table 11. Although the radical nature of 
both land reforms was remarkably similar, its implementation was 
much easier in Taiwan than in Korea. This was because the 
Kuomintang government which carried it out was non-indigenous 
and thus entirely cut off from landed interests. The Chinese nation-
alist government was made up of mainlanders who tended to look 
down on the Taiwanese and who were, furthermore, keen on 
agrarian reform "partly because they attributed their defeat on the 
mainland to the inequality of land ownership and partly because 
they themselves were no longer tied to the land". Hamilton (1983), 
p. 50. 
in the 1960s and 1970s,15 and of 5% per year in 
Taiwan beginning in the early 1950s.16 This had 
a favourable effect on accumulation by releasing 
a labour surplus which was then absorbed by 
industry, where it kept wages low. At the same 
time, the benefits of increased productivity were 
quite equitably spread among rural households. 
In spite of the fact that income levels remained 
low in absolute terms,17 the resulting pattern of 
income distribution contributed to an increase in 
consumption among rural households, which in 
turn led to growth in the demand for labour-
intensive wage goods. The expanded market 
which was thus created also favoured the growth 
of urban mass demand for similar goods. This 
phase, which took place in the 1950s, can be 
accurately described as "primary import-
substituting industrialization".18 
The Latin American pattern was entirely 
different. In the traditional export-oriented 
societies of Latin America, the very high concen-
tration of income which prevailed before 1930 
was a direct consequence of inequality in the 
distribution of assets (particularly land), coupled 
with unlimited supplies of labour and a predomi-
nant primary export orientation; these last two 
factors made internal demand basically irrele-
vant to growth and kept wages low (and often 
non-existent in the countryside). This also con-
tributed to the imposition, in all areas, of strict 
forms of labour control, which were essential 
mechanisms for the political domination of 
these societies by landed interests. 
In the more industrially advanced countries, 
there was some improvement in wage levels 
after 1930, when the "spontaneous" and res-
tricted industrialization which had taken place 
until then gave way to so-called "forced" import 
substitution, characterized by highly labour-
intensive manufacturing. However, this process 
was constrained by the combination of the 
unchanged patterns of land ownership with 
landlessness and unlimited supplies of labour in 
the countryside. This effectively excluded the 
vast majority of the labour force from the 
market, while maintaining wages low in indus-
l5Ro, Adams and Hushak (1981), p. 184. 
"Ong, Adams and Singh (1976), p. 578. 
"Ro, Adams and Hushak (1981), p. 183; Hyun, Adams and 
Hushak (1979), p. 449; Amsden (1985), p. 95, table 3.3. 
L
*On the concepts of primary and secondary ISI, see Ranis and 
Orrock (1985). 
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try as well. As the distribution of income 
remained very unequal, the growth of mass 
demand for basic consumer goods was limited; 
the resulting supply pattern became more and 
more oriented towards the satisfaction of high-
income demand and exhibited growing levels of 
product differentiation. 
An increasingly unequal distribution of 
income thus came to be a condition, as well as a 
consequence, of a skewed pattern of industrial 
supply. To refer to this period of Latin American 
industrialization also as "primary import substi-
tution", and so to imply that fundamental sim-
ilarities existed between the two models until 
the early 1960s, is thus to a large extent mislead-
ing. By the second half of the 1950s, the distribu-
tion of income was already sufficiently skewed in 
the more industrialized Latin American coun-
tries so that demand for locally-produced consu-
mer goods was not expanding "horizontally" 
(i.e., through a further social widening of popu-
lar demand for basic manufactured goods) but 
rather "vertically" (i.e., through a constant 
diversification of the higher-income strata of 
market demand). Accordingly, assembly plants 
multiplied to provide a correspondingly differ-
entiated supply of consumer durables. As early as 
the mid-1950s, the highest rates of industrial 
growth in these countries were already in electri-
cal and transport equipment, following the 
move of the upper strata of market demand into 
household appliances and private automobiles.19 
2. Land ownership and the sources of 
surpluses for accumulation 
In addition to affecting the composition of 
demand and the structure of industrial supply 
differently, the structure of ownership and con-
trol in the countryside produced yet another 
important difference between the two experien-
ces of import-substitution industrialization. 
This involved the pattern of industrial invest-
Li>In fact, the very expression "import substitution", as a 
description of this process, can be regarded as a misnomer, since in 
many cases industries were set up behind protective barriers to 
produce goods which had simply not been available before, or only 
in very small quantities. What was actually occurring was the 
establishment of industries for the local satisfaction of new 
demands which were being created through advertizing, the dem-
onstration effect, etc., or of anticipated demands on the part of 
higher-income groups as their living standards rose. See Pinto 
(1980), p. 47. 
ment and, more precisely, the way in which 
domestic savings contributed to industrial 
investment. Here again, classical theory is unfa-
vourable to small holdings; they are supposed to 
lead to increases in consumption and to generate 
a smaller surplus for investment. It is thus inter-
esting to examine the available evidence from 
both experiences pertaining to this issue; accord-
ing to the above theory, the East Asian countries 
should have exhibited lower domestic rates of 
savings and investment among rural households 
than those of Latin America. 
In fact, agriculture contributed to manufac-
turing investment in two ways in East Asia. The 
first was through voluntary savings. The evi-
dence from Korea and Taiwan shows that 
although the consumption of rural households 
went up in the 1950s and 1960s, it did not rise as 
fast as income. This resulted in a gradual 
increase in the average propensity to save (APS), 
particularly in the 1960s.20 Furthermore, 
through the setting up of rural financial markets 
offering attractive interest rates, a substantial 
proportion of such savings was mobilized for use 
by the rest of the economy.21 
The second way in which agriculture con-
tributed to industrial development in East Asia 
was through surplus extraction by the govern-
ment. Forced transfers from agriculture to 
industry began early, as part of the land reform 
programmes, with a substantial amount of the 
compensation to landlords being paid in govern-
ment bonds based on expropriated Japanese 
industrial assets.22 This tied many former land-
lords to industry and also set the pace for the 
capital transfers to come. In both countries, such 
transfers were achieved through production 
quotas (mainly for rice) subject to compulsory 
purchase by the government at below-market 
prices which were then sold cheaply to urban 
workers, thus lowering industrial wages and 
production costs.23 In addition, in Taiwan the 
government used the State monopoly on fertiliz-
ers to extract surplus through the setting of the 
barter ratio between fertilizers and rice24 and 
«See Ro, Adams and Hushak ( 1981 ); Ong, AdamsandSingh 
(1976); Hyun, Adams and Hushak (1979). 
"See Adams (1978). 
"Hamilton (1983), p. 50. 
"Hamilton (1983), p. 51; Amsden (1985), p. 86. 
»Koo(1968), pp. 79-82. 
216 CEPAL REVIEW No. 31 / April 1987 
used the State control of foreign trade to secure a 
margin between the price paid to producers and 
the price obtained abroad.25 In Korea, which, in 
contrast to Taiwan, "was and remains in sub-
stantial food deficit, [t]he primary mechanism 
for the exploitation of agriculture was to deny it 
the protection awarded industry and to import 
large quantities of food grains, often on conces-
sional terms".26 
The key point in the comparison between 
the East Asian and the Latin American NICs on 
this issue is, however, their use of those domestic 
savings. In Latin America, the savings generated 
by the large rural household sector tended to be 
invested speculatively rather than productively, 
a phenomenon which was related to the growing 
capital intensiveness of industrial production 
and the insufficiency of the market in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Whenever some extraction of agri-
cultural surplus did occur during this period, its 
burden was, in effect, transferred to the peasants 
through the political power of the landowners. 
Coupled with the existence of a labour surplus in 
the Latin American countryside, this made it 
unnecessary for agriculture to undergo a process 
of modernization; its productivity and income 
remained low, thus dampening both aggregate 
demand and the availability of wage goods. In 
Korea and Taiwan, both voluntary savings and 
surplus extraction played a particularly impor-
tant role in capital formation in the 1960s. In the 
preceding decade, the main source of investment 
surplus had been foreign savings, which were 
not in the form of direct foreign investment but 
of grants and loans from the United States 
government. This amounted to over one-half of 
gross investment in both countries,27 and was 
crucial to the high import-content industrializa-
tion model that was adopted, inasmuch as it 
helped finance the large foreign trade deficits 
which resulted. 
The successful completion of the first stage 
of ISI in both countries was thus in large measure 
"This is similar to the ill-fated IAPI policy implemented in 
Argentina in the late 1940s and early 1950s by the Peronist govern-
ment, which was quickly abandoned because it was largely respon-
sible for falling agricultural production. 
"Moore (1984), p. 58. 
"Such aid represented a larger percentage of total invest-
ment over a longer period in Korea than in Taiwan as a result of 
the stronger commitment of the United States to supporting 
Korea. See Kuznets (1977), p. 77. 
made possible by foreign assistance; to a great 
extent, this aid was prompted by the existence of 
the "communist threat" which, in turn, justified 
the expansion of government power in the 
internal sphere. The political and economic con-
ditions created during this initial stage were dec-
isive for the success of the next stage of 
industrialization, during the 1960s and 1970s. 
The growth of the internal market and the 
labour intensiveness of manufacturing produc-
tion made it attractive for local capital —under 
strong State guidance— to invest in industries 
requiring relatively small initial capital outlays 
which used technologies that were not subject to 
rapid rates of obsolescence and economies of 
scale. 
This is not to imply that the 1950s were an 
unmitigated success. For one thing, the rates of 
growth were substantially lower than in the 
1960s, particularly in Korea, where a high rate of 
population growth also made for a very modest 
level of per capita GDP growth. In addition, 
corruption and speculation tended to divert 
some capital away from productive investment 
in a way reminiscent of the Latin American 
experience. Perhaps most importantly in an 
overall evaluation, the political régimes were 
highly repressive, although this did not preclude 
a measure of State responsiveness to public 
opinion. Thus, in Korea, accusations of corrup-
tion and the I960 student revolt contributed to 
the replacement of the Rhee government by that 
of Park.28 In Taiwan, the Kuomintang govern-
ment showed concern about the alienation of the 
indigenous population, and efforts were made to 
carry out what has been called "political gap-
filling",29 which included increased preoccupa-
tion with economic development.10 
Yet, in direct contrast with the Latin Ameri-
can case, the ISI experience of Korea and Taiwan 
was an instance of capitalist development which 
was economically "¡nclusionary" in the sense 
that its dynamism was based on the progressive 
incorporation of the popular sectors through the 
expansion of the internal mass market. This was 
made possible by: i) the fact that in both coun-
tries the structure of asset ownership and 
income distribution at the start of the process 
"Hamilton (1984), p. 41. 
«Moore (1984), p. 58. 
"Amsden (1985), pp. 99-101. 
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was comparatively egalitarian for a developing 
country context; and ii) the fact that the State 
enjoyed a high degree of relative autonomy from 
traditional interests, which allowed it both to 
guarantee the conditions for a further reduction 
in income inequalities and to orient the alloca-
tion of the surplus towards the expansion of 
industrial capital that was producing for the 
mass market under reasonably efficient condi-
tions. This meant, however, that the model was 
politically exclusionary, in that it prevented any 
meaningful participation of the popular sectors 
in political decision-making; this feature was to 
become increasingly important as the models 
shifted towards an export orientation, which 
required a cheap and docile labour force. 
When the IS1 strategy began to show signs of 
exhaustion in both the East Asian and the Latin 
American models, further differences emerged 
which were in turn a result of the earlier dissimi-
larities between the two processes. 
3. From import substitution to 
export orientation 
The apparent similarity to be found in the fact 
that a crisis was provoked both in East Asia and 
¡n Latin America by the narrowness of the local 
markets and by external bottlenecks is mislead-
ing. As already discussed, in Latin America the 
insufficiency of internal markets was a conse-
quence of growing income concentration, which 
by the 1950s had already led to a pattern of 
supply characteristic of "secondary import-
substituting industrialization" involving an 
increasing capital intensiveness. As capital 
requirements for productive investment rose 
while the market narrowed, a drop in invest-
ment by domestic capital occurred towards the 
end of the 1950s. The governments responded to 
this situation with policies for attracting foreign 
capital which included increased protection and 
subsidies, often in the form of cheap inputs pro-
vided by large State-owned basic industries (not-
ably steel). The inflow of foreign firms 
reinforced the pattern of growing capital inten-
siveness and product differentiation, income 
concentration and skewed demand, and this 
further reduced the competitiveness of capital-
starved domestic firms. 
The intensification of these contradictions 
led the most advanced Latin American NICs to 
start moving in the direction of export-oriented 
industrialization (EOI) in the second half of the 
1960s. This move took place under very unfa-
vourable auspices, however. Foreign capital, on 
whose inflow it depended, was attracted more by 
the high profits guaranteed by overprotected 
local markets for high value-added consumer 
goods than by the very competitive export 
markets. As foreign capital-led industrialization 
proceeded on the basis of an increasing capital 
intensiveness, this had negative consequences 
for the potential diversification of exports, since 
the higher value added of the goods produced 
made them less likely to penetrate protected 
markets. 
As a result, foreign firms contributed neither 
to the expansion of exports nor to the relief of 
foreign exchange constraints.31 In this respect, 
their interest coincided with that of the land-
owning class, whose opposition to the growth of 
non-traditional exports was motivated by the 
threat that such a move would have posed to its 
own power position; in a context of rapid urban-
ization and shifting power bases, the position of 
this class rested on primary exports remaining 
the only source of foreign exchange. The Latin 
American response was thus essentially the out-
come of the many contradictions engendered by 
the populist alliances of the 1950s and early 
1960s and was due, in the final analysis, to the 
incapacity of the desarrollista State to impose a 
more viable model of industrialization involving 
both a different supply-demand pattern and 
domestic control of capital accumulation. 
By contrast, in East Asia the narrowness of 
local markets was due to a relative saturation of 
popular demand for non-durables, and the 
response was an expansion in exports of the 
labour-intensive manufactures that had been the 
backbone of the industrialization process. 
"Primary import-substituting industrialization" 
gave way to "primary export substitution". This 
allowed aggregate internal demand to remain 
strong and also helped East Asian exports to 
penetrate European and North American 
markets because of their low value-added. In 
addition, their early presence in these markets in 
the 1960s made it possible to raise their value-
added in exports during the 1970s without incur-
"SeeLahera (1985). 
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ring as great a protectionist reaction as that faced 
by other new competitors. 
In one sense, the move to "primary export 
substitution" might be explained simply as a 
function of overcapacity, which in turn resulted 
from the saturation of internal mass demand, 
particularly since such a move would also reduce 
the pressure exerted on the balance of payments 
by the high import content of import substitu-
tion. If that were the case, however, overcapacity 
in Latin America should have produced similarly 
impressive results in its export performance, 
which it has not. In reality, the East Asian pro-
cess was more complex. The balance-of-
payments deficit prompted the United States 
(which was financing it) to press for an 
improvement ¡n export performance. The pros-
pect of a reduction in United States aid was 
certainly an important factor in the decision of 
both the Korean and the Taiwanese govern-
ments to expand industrial output and to direct it 
towards external markets. However, the move 
was not merely a response to external bottle-
necks; it was also the result of a long-term stra-
tegy planned by the State, in collaboration with 
local capital and with United States suppport, 
which was designed to make these countries into 
capitalist successes in spite of their poor natural 
resource endowment and small markets. 
4. The policy differences 
There appear to be three crucial policy-
determined factors which account for the differ-
ential success of the East Asian and the Latin 
American NICs. 
a) The nature of protection 
The highly discriminatory character of East 
Asian protectionist policies is in sharp contrast 
with those of Latin America, where indiscrimi-
nate protection was given early on to consumer 
goods, while intermediate goods were allowed to 
enter freely. The East Asian policies, in contrast, 
discriminated both among sectors of production 
(consumer goods imports were not systemati-
cally kept out, nor were all intermediate and 
capital goods allowed in) and within sectors as 
well, with particular industries being selected for 
protection while others were not. The selection 
criteria seem to have been designed to promote 
efficiency among local producers by subjecting 
them to competition and to favour both the 
more efficient and the more export-oriented 
industries; but, significantly, key import substi-
tuting industries also benefited from high effec-
tive rates of protection, bearing evidence of the 
State's concern for linking the EOI and 1SI strate-
gies and, hence, of the compatibility between the 
two. Apart from primary commodities and 
investment goods, which were generally exemp-
ted, quotas and tariffs were extensively used, 
with the value added in imported goods usually 
determining the tariff rates applied. In both 
countries, the so-called "liberalization" of the 
late 1950s and early 1960s did not affect the rate 
of effective protection, which remained high for 
all key import substitutes; in Taiwan, most 
import tariffs were (and still are) redundant, i.e., 
higher than necessary,32 and this is true in Korea 
as well53 Export minimums were (and continue 
to be) required of importing firms in exchange 
for duty-free imports, and access to the foreign 
credit necessary to finance imports remains con-
trolled in Korea. These differences between the 
protectionist policies of Latin America and those 
of East Asia had a strong impact on exchange 
rates: to compensate for the growing cost of 
imports resulting from tariffs in Latin America, 
policies of overvaluation were introduced which 
were a further obstacle to exports; in East Asia, 
by contrast, exchange rates were constantly 
adjusted to meet export targets. 
It is important to stress that the choice of 
policy packages was to a large extent determined 
by the freedom of State action in East Asia and 
its absence in Latin America. In the East Asian 
countries, export-based industrialization was a 
State-directed strategy supported by the United 
States which met with no political opposition 
from any major sector of civil society; this lack of 
opposition was partly due to represssion, but 
also to the tabula rasa effect of both colonial rule 
and the wars, and to the existence of an external 
threat. In Latin America, the indiscriminate 
over-protection given to the producers of consu-
mer goods had its origins in the political allian-
ces which implemented ISI after 1930; the 
protectionist policies adopted there have been 
described by Hirschman as "a plot on the part of 
"Amsden (1985), p. 89. 
"Kuznets (1977), p. 153. 
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the existing powerholders to corrupt or buy off 
the new industrialists".34 When foreign capital 
entered these countries in the 1960s and 1970s it 
too began to benefit from the same policies and, 
since it was only interested in local markets, 
protectionism went on unchanged, screening 
small captive markets off from competition and 
encouraging inefficiency in production. 
b) Agricultural terms of trade and the mobiliza-
tion of domestic savings 
As noted earlier, in Korea and Taiwan the 
State initially based its labour-intensive indus-
trial strategy on the extraction of both the capital 
and the labour surplus from agriculture, which 
was thus made to contribute heavily to indus-
trialization. By the mid-1960s, the absorption of 
the labour surplus had been so effective that a 
situation of relative labour scarcity began to 
emerge; at the same time, the continuous capital 
transfers from agriculture had caused agricultu-
ral production to slow down and rural household 
income to gradually fall behind non-rural 
income, thus threatening both accumulation at 
the national level and political stability in the 
countryside. Instead of using repression against 
the farmers, whose support they needed, the 
governments then designed "new deals" which 
began shifting the terms of trade in favour of 
agriculture in both countries and which are all 
the more interesting because they represented a 
political as well as an economic response. This 
took the form of a rapprochement, promoted by 
Chiang Kai Shek's son, between the Kuomin-
tang and the farmers in Taiwan, and of a rural-
oriented ideological movement under the 
influence of President Park in Korea.*5 These 
"new deals" were yet another instance, not only 
of the extent of State intervention in the econ-
omy, but also of the State's interest in preventing 
imbalances between agriculture and industry 
from becoming too pronounced in order to pro-
tect sources of accumulation. This objective was 
achieved through changes in pricing policies and 
investment priorities and through schemes 
designed to improve rural household income 
levels through the development of rural indus-
tries. The scheme produced remarkable results 
HHirschman(1971), p. 107. 
"Moore (1984), pp. 59-60. 
in Taiwan, "where the share of rural family 
income derived from non-agricultural actitivies 
(rose) from 33% in 1964 to 53% in 1972";* if 
Korea's record is less impressive in this respect, 
it is because its industrial structure was still rela-
tively dispersed and rural prior to 1968. " 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s both rural 
and non-rural household income levels 
remained low in absolute terms.38 Real indus-
trial wages rose, but more slowly than labour 
productivity,39 allowing for a substantial rate of 
surplus extraction within the industrial sector; 
by 1978, whereas Korean wages compared 
favourably with those in Hong Kong, Taiwanese 
wages were much lower across the board, and 
this was reflected in highly repressive policies 
vis-a-vis trade unions. The fact that income dis-
tribution did not deteriorate in Korea and 
improved in Taiwan was largely due to the dyna-
mism of their economies, in which industrial 
employment was expanding dramatically, rather 
than to any reduction in income inequality 
within industry. However, the increase in 
domestic earnings as a proportion of GNP dur-
ing this period cannot be explained wholly by the 
rising share of industrial profits in national 
income; the average propensity to save (APS) of 
low income households also continued to go up 
in both countries40 as their income rose in real 
terms.41 
The lesson to be drawn from the experiences 
of Korea and Taiwan is that absolute levels of 
income no more determine a counry's APS than 
the percentage of national income that is saved 
determines the level of capital formation. Until 
the mid-1960s, the savings ratio of both East 
Asian countries had been low (6%-7% of GNP) 
compared to average Latin American domestic 
savings. It then rose rapidly, but in the early 
1970s, at 17%,42 Korean domestic savings were 
matched by Bolivia, Colombia and Mexico and 
exceeded by Ecuador; while, at 26.8%,4} Taiwa-
nese savings were matched by Brazil and 
«Ranis (1978), p. 400. 
"See Ho (1982). 
«Amsden (1985), p. 95, table 3.3. 
wAmsden (1985), p. 96, table 3.4. 
«Adams (1978), pp. 551 and 554. 
4lOng, Adams and Singh (1976), p. 580; Hyun, Adams and 
Hushak (1979), p. 449. 
«Westphal (1978), p. 349, table 1. 
4,Amsden(1985), p.97. 
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exceeded by Venezuela (36.2%).44 Similarly, 
there were no substantial differences in gross 
fixed capital formation between East Asia and 
Latin America in the 1970s. 
The differences between these groups of 
countries appear at two levels. The first concerns 
the trends of both domestc savings and capital 
formation in the 1970s and 1980s. Whereas all 
the Latin American countries exhibited a con-
stant decline in both these variables during the 
period, the East Asian countries maintained 
their performance or even —in the case of 
Taiwan— improved it.45 The second concerns 
the greater success, as already discussed, of the 
East Asian countries in mobilizing domestic sav-
ings for capital formation. While the presence of 
adequate financial markets in East Asia and their 
absence in Latin America was an important fac-
tor, it would appear that the basic difference 
between the two experiences was the composi-
tion of private domestic savings. In Latin Amer-
ica, the high concentration of income led to a 
high concentration of savings, and the latter 
tended to follow alternative circuits which were 
less available to popular savings, such as specula-
tive investments and capital flight. In contrast, 
capital formation in the East Asian NICs was 
financed increasingly with domestic savings in 
the 1970s, particularly in Taiwan, which 
—contrary to Korea— maintained a labour-
intensive industrialization policy. In Korea, the 
greater capital intensiveness introduced in the 
1970s required heavy investments, which were 
financed with foreign savings; still, the resulting 
foreign debt of US$ 40 billion at the end of 1983 
did not seem as excessive as that of the Latin 
American NICs, since Korean export earnings in 
that same year were US$ 31 billion. By contrast, 
the growth of external borrowing in Latin 
America was increasingly used to cover debt 
servicing and the fiscal deficit, and was thus 
contributing less and less to capital formation. 
When the sources of foreign savings dried up for 
Latin America in the early 1980s, capital forma-
tion plummetted in spite of desperate attempts 
by the State to maintain some degree of invest-
ment momentum in order to reduce the impact 
of the recession. 
"See IDB (various issues). 
«Amsden (1985), p. 105, note 70. 
c) The treatment of foreign capital 
The issue here is as much one of policy as of 
the objective degree of domestic control over 
capital accumulation achieved in East Asia and in 
Latin America. In Latin America, the growing 
effective foreign control over capital accumula-
tion, coupled with domestic policies seeking to 
attract as much direct foreign investment (DFI) 
as possible, meant that any form of control over 
foreign capital was always going to be largely 
ineffectual. In contrast, thanks to their domestic 
process of capital accumulation, the East Asian 
countries could impose a much stricter control 
over DFI and thus ensure its effectiveness. 
This form of control followed in the steps of 
the protectionist policies on imports and was 
introduced in order to regulate DFI flows 
attracted by the countries' economic success of 
the late 1960s. In Taiwan, the large drop in the 
share of public ownership in total industrial pro-
duction which took place between 1962 and 1975 
(from 46% to 19%)46 did not result in foreign 
capital assuming a dominant position in the 
economy. Between 1973 and 1980, foreign firms 
were responsible for only 10% of total invest-
ment in manufacturing,47 and the State —rather 
than multinationals— maintained control over 
key sectors of the economy, with the State's 
share of gross domestic investment still amount-
ing to 50% in 1980. The Korean pattern was 
similar, although DFI contributed even less to 
capital formation there than in Taiwan (a mere 
1.2% in the period 1962-1979).48 Admittedly, 
the trend was more pronounced in both coun-
tries in the 1970s than in the 1960s, but even 
then the policy towards DFI was far from liberal 
and the share of DFI in manufacturing was kept 
very low.49 Control over DFI has allowed both 
countries to keep in check a major source both 
income concentration and capital intensity 
which —by contrast— has had a particularly 
negative impact on the Latin American 
economies. 
Nevertheless, a move in the direction of 
greater capital intensiveness took place in East 
Asia during the second half of the 1970s. The 
move was broadly inspired by the desire to 
«Amsden (1985), p. 92, table 3.2. 
"Amsden (1985), p. 93. 
«Hamilton (1983), p-61. 
«Luedde-Neurath (1984), p. 18. 
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reduce reliance on labour-intensive exports and 
to increase exported value-added. It was more 
pronounced in Korea, where the government 
tends to be more responsive to large business 
interests than in Taiwan. Interestingly, the con-
sequences of this move on the Korean economy 
soon began to increase its differences with the 
Taiwanese economy and to bring it closer to the 
Latin American NICs. Trends of unemployment, 
income inequality, high technological costs and 
transfers, growing current account deficits, infla-
tionary financing, currency overvaluation, excess 
capacity and bankruptcies —all of which are 
characteristic of the Latin American NICs— 
began to develop in the Korean economy as 
well.50 In Taiwan, the Kuomintang government 
was less sanguine about this form of deepening 
industrialization, and monopolistic trends were 
more discrete; as a result, the consequences of 
this policy shift were less serious than in Korea. 
The lesson was quickly learned, however, and a 
move back to more traditional labour-intensive 
exports took place in 1981.51 This move was 
made easier by the minority position of DFI in 
manufacturing and by the high degree of State 
control over capital accumulation, which was 
itself a result of the State's "relative autonomy" 
from the dominant classes. The State was, in 
fact, relatively more autonomous in Taiwan than 
in Korea, and was therefore able to maintain a 
greater overall stability in its economic policy-
making. 
The picture that emerges from the preced-
ing overview is that strong State intervention 
had a decisive impact on the success of the East 
Asian export-led models of growth, which 
started with land reform and then developed on 
the basis of a State-directed economic strategy. 
This bears little resemblance to the free market 
models which supposedly account for their suc-
cess, according to monetarist analysis, and which 
have been presented to Latin America as exam-
ples to be followed through massive State 
withdrawal. 
It seems equally clear that there were excep-
tional political conditions which made such deci-
sive State action possible, including the colonial 
history of both countries and their position at 
the forefront of the Cold War. That position 
>°SeeKoo(1984). 
"Hamilton (1983), pp. 68-9. 
explains the extent of the support provided by 
the United States, and the combination of the 
two factors accounts for the exceptionally radical 
nature of their land reforms, which were them-
selves the first decisive move made to free the 
State from the traditional landed interests that 
have blocked development elsewhere in the 
Third World. In summary, the ability of the East 
Asian countries in question to carry out a suc-
cessful experience of peripheral capitalist devel-
opment was a function of the following four 
factors: 
1) the economically inclusionary character of 
their ISI phase; 
2) the relative autonomy of the State both to 
implement this inclusionary process and to 
orient the surplus away from traditional 
agrarian sectors and towards the emerging 
industrial capital, which was operating with 
reasonable efficiency to supply a mass 
market; 
3) in the EOI stage, the ability of the State to 
direct industrial investment towards areas 
where international competitiveness could 
be achieved (again, a question of State auto-
nomy, this time vis-a-vis sectors and groups 
within industrial capital) and to repress and 
coerce labour to achieve the low cost and 
reliability required for international 
competitiveness; 
4) the emergence of an indigenous capitalist 
class with a dynamic and innovative outlook 
which was able to carry out the process of 
industrial change and development envis-
aged by the State. This introduced a poten-
tial contradiction into the model, since this 
capitalist class began to encroach on the 
autonomy of the State, while at the same 
time the development thus far achieved 
tended to produce a mobilization of the pop-
ular sectors which, again, threatened the 
conditions necessary for the reproduction of 
the model. This process has been particu-
larly visible in Korea in the late 1970s and 
the 1980s. 
The above conditions did not obtain in Latin 
America, where the model was always funda-
mentally exclusionary, where the State had much 
less autonomy with respect to the dominant 
internal classes and foreign capital, where local 
industrial capital did not perform the role of a 
dynamic agent of industrial change, and where 
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the popular sectors were both mobilized and 
controlled at an early stage through populist 
movements. In a later section of this article it 
will be argued that these differences make a 
replication of the East Asian experience of peri-
pheral capitalist development unattainable in 
Latin America. At this point, however, the idea 
to be emphasized is that the different context of 
State intervention in Latin America —which is 
The orthodox approach to the problems of 
adjustment in Latin America involves not only 
short-term "stabilization" measures but also a 
central structural component. Underlying the 
"performance criteria" and the "policy under-
standings" that the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) attaches to its stand-by agreements 
and extended financing facilities, there is the 
clear notion that, in the final analysis, the only 
solution to the chronic balance-of-payments and 
fiscal problems of the Latin American countries 
lies in a fundamental restructuring of their 
economies. 
There are two main goals. The first is to shift 
the productive structure towards tradeable goods 
and, more specifically, to increase the share of 
exports in GNP. The measures recommended 
for accomplishing this point to: a) a reduction of 
internal demand (through wage restraint, 
domestic price rises and a credit squeeze) and, 
hence, an increase in domestic savings to be 
invested in expanding productive capacity in the 
tradeable goods sector; b) devaluation and trade 
liberalization in order to boost exports and 
encourage private investment in competitive 
industries. Together with increased domestic 
savings and lower inflation, this should reverse 
the flow of capital flight and reduce dependence 
on foreign credit. The second is to reduce the role 
of the State, both as an interventor and as a direct 
producer. Statism is to give way to privatization; 
this is also seen as a pre-condition for recovery, 
and one which has to be met rapidly, for it is 
assumed that the flow of capital flight will not be 
more representative of Third World States than 
are Korea and Taiwan— has determined the 
particular role played by the State in accumula-
tion. This in turn, has been responsible for a 
fiscal crisis whose implications go beyond the 
impact of the fiscal crisis in central economies, 
inasmuch as in Latin America, it has tended to 
generate an overall crisis of accumulation. 
reversed until the State moves out of the many 
sectors in which it has been "crowding out" 
private capital. 
These recommendations raise several issues 
of a general character concerning the role of the 
State in accumulation. They also, however, raise 
some specific questions about both the imme-
diate and long-term impact of such a strategy on 
Latin America. 
The first question is made almost self-
evident by the strong export-orientation of the 
strategy and concerns the export prospects of 
Latin America. Its creditors seem convinced that, 
in a context of world economic recovery and 
trade liberalization, the performance of Latin 
American exports should depend mostly on the 
determination of the Latin American countries 
in their drive towards exports. The pertinent 
point here is therefore to assess its export pros-
pects both in relation to growth and accumula-
tion in the long term and as a viable solution to 
the debt crisis. 
The second question concerns the new polit-
ical environment in which this export strategy 
(largely designed in the early 1980s) will have to 
be implemented. While it might be safely hypo-
thesized that authoritarian governments based 
on repression were broadly in agreement with 
the adjustment policies recommended by Latin 
America's creditors in the early 1980s, the open-
ing up of political systems that has since taken 
place in some of the Latin American deficit coun-
tries —which thus have to reckon once again 
with public opinion— raises a new set of issues. 
These issues concern both the impact of "redem-
HI 
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Table 1 
EXPORTS OF GOODS FROM TEN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 



















































































Source: ECLAC (1986a), p. 28, table 9. 
ocratization" on adjustment and, conversely, the 
impact which the adjustment policies that they 
have inherited may have on the stability of the 
new democratic arrangements. 
1. The export prospects of Latin America 
The current global strategy for Latin America is 
based, rather perilously, on future developments 
over which it has little control. Its creditors' 
support of export led-growth was reinforced by 
its 1984 export performance (see table 1). 
Although Latin America's average export 
growth was modest when compared with that of 
East Asia, with only Brazil and Colombia show-
ing truly high growth rates;" these results were 
nonetheless seen as evidence which backed up 
the projections of a worldwide economic recov-
ery. Furthermore, they seemed to confirm the 
allegation repeatedly made since 1982 by the IMF 
and the creditors, namely that international 
interest rates mattered less to Latin America 
than the export prospects offered by the recov-
ery of OECD countries. 
"Significantly, although in 1984 Btazil's and Colombia's 
export growth was higher than Korea's (13.3%), and compared 
favourably even with Taiwan's (20.6%), the East Asian countries 
achieved much greater GDP growth: Korea (7.5%) and Taiwan 
(10.9%) as against Brazil (4.8%) and Colombia (3.6%). World 
Financial Markets ( 1985b), p. 4, tables 5 and 6; ECLAC ( 1986a), 
p. 24, table 2. 
Yet, in 1984, in spite of earlier hopes that it 
would be more widespread, the recovery 
remained restricted to the United States; furth-
ermore, it did not last, and in mid-1985 it was 
widely recognized that the earlier predictions 
had been too optimistic and that real GNP 
growth would be about 2.5% in the OECD coun-
tries, including the United States. This only con-
firmed the signs that had been visible in the 
United States economy since mid-1984, which 
indicated a considerable slowdown in the growth 
of domestic demand in the United States (from 
8.8% to 3-3%) and thus imports. Latin Ameri-
can export projections had been based on the 
assumption that the United States' recovery 
would continue and that its effects would be 
transmitted to other OECD countries. In 1985, 
the slowdown of United States imports and the 
persistence of Japanese and European reductions 
in their imports from Latin American countries 
had already affected the latter's exports, with the 
exception of Argentina, Chile, Colombia and 
Ecuador; compared with 1984 there were drops 
in value of 5.2 % fro Brazil and 9.1% for Mexico 
(see table 1). For the ten countries studied, taken 
together, the value of exports in 1985 was the 
same in current terms as it had been in 1984.53 
"Calculated on the basis of ECLAC (1986a), p. 28, table 9 and 
ECLAC (1986), passim. 
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One consequence of the fact that export per-
formance in 1985 was poorer than had been 
expected was that the 1983-1984 improvement 
in the trade balance (and its positive effect on the 
current account as a whole) was not maintained. 
This faced the Latin American countries with a 
choice: either they could continue to cut back 
imports, in which case output would fall further, 
or they could reactivate imports, at least in some 
essential input sectors, in order to avoid a deep-
ening of the recession and social and political 
unrest. The second approach seemed more 
likely, particulaly since one of the creditors' most 
consistent recommendations was for trade liber-
alization; but with insufficient foreign exchange 
earnings accruing from exports, import costs 
(which were rising in absolute terms as well as 
relative to falling export earnings) would have 
to be met by more foreign borrowing. Whether 
the foreign credit would be forthcoming was 
(and still is) highly problematic. 
Given the near insignificance of other 
export markets, the import performance of the 
major OECD countries, as described earlier, sug-
gests the need for a more realistic projection of 
Latin American exports for the rest of the 
decade. It is, of course, impossible to predict how 
long the present depressed conjuncture will last 
in the 1990s. As long as it does, however, it will 
have drastic effects on economies which have 
been made to rely too heavily on export markets: 
1) commodity prices (including oil) will con-
tinue to be depressed in spite of the depreciation 
of the dollar;54 2) manufactured exports will 
continue to face protectionism in Europe and 
Japan. It is also relatively safe to predict that the 
need to reduce the United States' large trade 
deficit will induce the UnitedStates Department 
of Commerce to redouble its denunciations of 
unfair practices by Latin American countries in 
order to justify further import restrictions. 
The export prospects of Latin America are 
no better even when they are viewed from a 
longer-term perspective. The EOI model would 
still remain a fallacy for most countries in the 
area, even under the labour-intensive form 
which the authors of some proposals now seem 
"For the ten countries covered in this analysis, the terms of 
trade deteriorated at an average cumulative rate of about 17% over 
the period 1980-1985 according to data in ECLAC ( 1986a), p. 29, 
table 11. 
inclined to resuscitate. There are two reasons for 
this: 1) low as they are, Latin American labour 
costs cannot match the still lower costs of many 
other Third World countries and; 2) a "generali-
sation of the East-Asian model of export-led 
development across all developing countries 
would result in untenable market penetration 
into industrial countries".55 Of those Latin 
American countries that are already classified as 
NICs, only Brazil and Mexico and —to a lesser 
extent— Colombia, might be allowed to proceed 
further, provided they can also introduce the 
supportive fiscal, monetary, wage and exchange 
rate policies which are required for export suc-
cess; these policies may be politically difficult to 
negotiate, however, in the context of régimes 
which need to count on some degree of nationl 
consensus in order to remain stable. In the other 
countries, primary commodities will continue to 
dominate exports, with perhaps a further pro-
cessing of raw material exports; this will, how-
ever, increase both their dependence on 
oligopolistic markets and the risk of adverse 
external shocks (already inherent in primary 
exports) by exposing exports "to greater risks of 
substitution by new products or obsolescence in 
the face of new technology".56 
2. The external debt crisis 
The available evidence indicates unequivocally 
that the foundation of the export-led strategy is 
weak and unrealistic: it will not simply be up to 
the Latin American countries to improve their 
export performance in the foreseeable future, 
and the conditions which seem most likely to 
determine that performance are not favourable 
to the growth of Latin American exports. In 
these circumstances, what solution is there to the 
debt crisis and what justification is there for the 
squeeze imposed on internal demand? 
The foreign debt problem grew particularly 
acute in 1985- Compared to 1982, the debt-to-
export ratio worsened for all countries except 
Brazil and Colombia (where it improved 
slightly) and Ecuador (where it remained the 
same). The foreign debt came to represent 
between two and six times the dollar value of the 
annual merchandise exports of the countries 
"Cline (1982), p. 88. 
,6Roemer(1981), p.432. 
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covered in this study.57 What is more, the large 
drop in international interest rates, which, at 
about 8%, were at half their 1982 level in 1985, 
did little to alleviate the ratio of interest pay-
ments to exports: as in 1982 these payments 
continued to absorb between one-fourth and 
three-fifths of the countries' total export earn-
ings.58 It should also be remembered that these 
figures do not reflect the total service on the 
gross foreign debt, since they only represent 
interest payments on the medium- and long-
term debt; this leaves out the repayment of the 
principal that falls due at the end of each finan-
cial year, as well as interest and principal on the 
short-term debt (i.e., debts with a maturity of up 
to one year), whose volume has tended to grow 
constantly since the late 1970s. It is not easy to 
obtain reliable up-to-date information on the 
latter category of debt but, if included, the total 
service of the gross foreign debt (and thus its 
ratio to exports) would be much worse, particu-
larly for countries like Argentina, Brazil, Mexico 
and Venezuela, which rely heavily on short-term 
debt.5? 
With a debt crisis that can only get worse and 
with poor export prospects, the chances of cov-
ering a growing foreign exchange deficit 
through new borrowing would appear to be slim. 
In a situation in which the gradual withdrawal of 
the IMF from lending activities will leave com-
mercial banks to handle the bulk of available 
credit (to an even greater extent than they have 
so far), the most likely future scenario is that the 
banks —keen not to become overexposed again 
vis-a-vis their largest debtors— may be prepared 
to extend new but limited credit only in so far as 
interest payments on the existing debt are met. 
The banks in this situation seem to be under no 
illusion concerning the reimbursement of the 
debts; rather, their aim seems to be to avoid a 
major world financial crisis by keeping pressure 
on the debtor countries to spread a de facto 
moratorium over a long period of time in order 
to cushion its impact on themselves and on the 
creditor countries. By reducing their exposure to 
the major debtors and by cutting back sharply on 
their lending to Latin American and other Third 
"Calculated on the basis of data in ECLAC (1986) and 
ECLAC (1986a), p. 30, table 14 and p. 32, table 17, respectively. 
«ECLAC (1986a), p. 32, table 18. 
"World Financial Markets (1983), p. 5, table 3-
World countries between 1982 and 1986, the 
banks put themselves in a stronger position with 
respect to the debtor countries. Having learned 
their lesson from the crisis, international finan-
cial markets will not be closed to underdeveloped 
countries, but it will be more difficult for these 
countries, including most NICs, to gain access to 
them than before. 
The foreign creditors' advice to borrowers ¡s 
thus that they should rely on their own domestic 
savings. Yet, together with domestic invest-
ment, national savings have gone down since the 
mid-1970s, and the drop ¡n both has become 
much more pronounced since 1979-1980 (see 
table 2). Until 1982, the decline was sharper in 
savings than in investment, with only Peru 
—surprisingly— maintaining the same rate of 
savings (admittedly low, even by Latin American 
standards) and showing an increase in invest-
ment over the {equally low) 1977-1980 average. 
Investment fared better than savings thanks to 
foreign capital, which continued to flow into 
these countries, albeit at reduced rates. In the 
following period (1982-1984) there was a 
further decline in both savings and investment, 
but this time the decrease was more acute in 
investment than in savings due to a virtual stop-
page of foreign capital inflows. Countries like 
Brazil and Mexico, where the possibilities for 
speculation were great, managed a small 
increase in national savings, even while capital 
flight continued; as for investment, it was down 
again everywhere except in Chile, where it reco-
vered slightly. 
A resumption of investment is clearly 
needed as much as a reactivation of imports. 
Since the purpose is to make the debtors more 
self-reliant, the aim is not simply to increase the 
rate of gross domestic savings but also to: 
1) reduce the rate of their remittance abroad, 
which has been one of the most consistent fail-
ures of all the Latin Ameican policies thus far 
designed to raise savings for investment; and 
2) attract these national savings away from spec-
ulation and into productive investment. Accord-
ing to the creditors, this can be achieved if a new 
investment climate is created, and by that they 
mean essentially lower inflation and trade liber-
alization in the debtor countries. It is further 
assumed that the resulting increased output will 
find its way into the export markets, while the 
goal of lower inflation is to be achieved through 
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Table 2 
GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 
A N D N A T I O N A L SAVINGS, 
1977-1980, 1982, 1984 
IN TEN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
(As a percentage of GDP) 
Average 




























































































Source; The data for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela are from World 
Financial Markets (1985c), p. 6, table 10, for the 
1977-1980 average and they have been calculated 
from the same table for 1982 and 1984; the data on 
investment for Bolivia, Colombia and Uruguay 
have been calculated from 1DB figures (various 
issues); the data on savings for Bolivia, Colombia 
and Uruguay have been calculated on the basis of 
figures ¡n CEPAL (1984), pp. 224-5, table 106 and 
pp. 248-9, table 118. 
"1983. 
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a reduction in internal demand (wage restraint, a 
credit squeeze and a reduction of the public sec-
tor deficit). However, with the poor export pros-
pects analysed earlier, exports are unlikely to 
expand at the rate required, and lower internal 
demand can only mean lower aggregate demand, 
which would lead to a further fall in output. This 
trend is already visible in the key sector of manu-
facturing, where the fall in internal demand and 
the consequent drop in output has led since 1981 
—in the assessment of the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB)— to "an increase in 
idle installed plant capacity —its utilization fell 
to levels of almost 50% in several countries— 
and a consequent decrease in productivity, but 
the levels of industrial investment have also 
fallen so low that they will undoubtedly affect 
the growth potential in the years to come in 
most of the major producers of the region".60 
The same tendency will inevitably continue 
if poor export prospects are coupled with auster-
ity measures which depress domestic demand. 
Since low aggregate demand can only divert 
domestic savings away from productive invest-
ment, it is difficult to see how the trend of 
speculation and capital flight can be reversed. It 
is true that perhaps the main shortcoming of 
accumulation in Latin America is that it has 
never been able to rely sufficiently on domestic 
savings. Nonetheless, the mistake of the "adjust-
ment" strategies is their assumption that an 
investment climate can be restored without gua-
rantees that market demand can match supply. 
With export markets clearly incapable of offer-
ing such guarantees, they could only come from 
an expansion of a long-neglected domestic 
market —not vertically, as has always been the 
case since the 1950s, but horizontally, i.e., 
through a more equal spread of income. This 
would make both economic and political sense in 
the context of the opening up of Latin American 
political systems. 
3. The adjustment and the opening 
up of political systems 
The issue of adjustment has been raised at a time 
when the political systems of Latin America are 
undergoing, or are likely to undergo, fundamen-
tal changes. These changes do not relate simply 
«>IDB (1984b), p. 201. 
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to a return to civilian rule. In most of these 
countries, the urban labour movement is also 
emerging as a more autonomous political force 
which is likely to prove difficult to control 
through repression or co-optation, as different 
kinds of régimes have done in the past. As for 
the long-neglected rural labour force, it too has 
become more articulate and will undoubtedly 
present a new challenge in many countries of the 
area. 
It is therefore in a context of political unrest 
and change that the Latin American govern-
ments must develop policies to revive accumula-
tion, restore growth and achieve development. 
This immediately raises the question of the mag-
nitude of the effort that will be required to reacti-
vate accumulation and its implications in terms 
of the distribution of income, the level of con-
sumption of the popular sectors, the level of 
public expenditure, the fiscal deficit and the 
increase in foreign exchange requirements as a 
result of the debt burden. In 1984 the IDB issued 
some projections covering seven Latin Ameri-
can countries which are helpful in assessing the 
magnitude of the problem.61 Two scenarios were 
proposed, both assuming that the countries 
would "persevere in applying the economic aus-
terity policies initiated during the 1982-1983 
crisis. This involves restrictive monetary and 
fiscal policy measures to hold down any expan-
sion of domestic absorption of resources in con-
sumption and investment such that the sum of 
domestic expenditure remains within the limits 
of the real value of GDP".62 The main difference 
between the two is in the level of net external 
financing required to sustain the hypothesized 
economic growth rate. 
The first scenario postulates a GDP growth 
rate of 2.7% per annum in 1986-1990, i.e., about 
half the rate of growth for the 20 years preceding 
the crisis of the 1980s. In this hypothesis, con-
sumption in the countries concerned should 
grow at no more than 2.8% per annum (again, 
about half of the 1960-1980 rate) while invest-
ment should grow at 2.9% per annum; the latter 
would, of course, be a major reversal of the trend 
seen since 1981, which indicates a fall in gross 
domestic investment in the countries concerned 
of 11.4% per year up to 1984 (the last year for 
ilIDB (1984a), pp.49 ff. 
«/«</., p. 49. 
which complete statistics are available). In con-
flict with the social and political requirements of 
the new régimes, such an effort would call for 
tight constraints on the improvement of the 
living standards of the popular sectors; the sce-
nario in fact assumes that per capita consump-
tion levels would remain at the same level as in 
1983, the crisis year, and while assuming no 
change in income distribution, it suggests that 
the need to force an equilibrium in the balance of 
payments might trigger inflation that could 
"shift the cost of the adjustment in the house-
hold sector".6î The scenario would also call for a 
stepping up of State investment, notably in 
infrastructure. 
In the absence of a major tax reform, this 
would either conflict with the policy of control 
over internal borrowing or call for increased 
external indebtedness. The model allows for an 
external financing gap of US$ 4.3 billion per 
year throughout the period, with an increase in 
the external debt of the countries concerned of 
20% as compared to 1983. Since, at the same 
time, the payment of interest on the existing 
debt is projected to be about US$ 40 billion per 
year, the scenario calls for a joint trade surplus 
for the countries in question of US$ 50.7 billion 
per year throughout the period. For these pur-
poses the model assumes a rate of growth in 
export revenues of 11.7% per year during the 
1984-1990 period. In the light of the previous 
discussion this is, of course, a highly questionable 
assumption; indeed, it has already been dis-
proved by the performance of the economies 
involved in the two years following the projec-
tion: after an increase of 12.7% in the value of 
the merchandise exports of these economies in 
1984, a drop of 5.4% was recorded in 198564 and 
the declining trend continued in 1986. 
The second IDB scenario postulates at GDP 
growth rate of 5.5% per annum in these seven 
countries for the period 1986-1990, allowing for 
a rate of growth in consumption of 5.7%, and 
assumes a more realistic surplus of US$ 30 bil-
lion. However, this scenario calls for a level of 
net external financing of US$ 55.7 billion per 
year, which, by 1990, would increase the total 
foreign debt of the seven countries by 75% as 
" /«¿ , p. 63 
"ECLAC (1986a), p. 30, table 14. 
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compared to 1983 and would maintain an inter-
est/export ratio of nearly 30% throughout the 
remainder of the decade. Again, the external 
financing requirements of this scenario and their 
implications make its realism questionable. 
This discussion helps to illustrate the conclu-
1. The nature of the transformation 
A preliminary caveat is called for here. The 
notion of "another development"65 to which the 
model envisaged here relates, is sometimes 
interpreted as meaning a return to pre-industrial 
forms of production, consumption and social 
relations, with technology being deliberately 
downgraded and industry taking a second place 
to agricultural development. While it is clear 
that the kind of industrial and technological 
development which has taken place in Latin 
America has reached an impasse, it should also 
be clear that the way forward cannot be envis-
aged in terms of a retreat into pre-industrial 
society. The Latin American countries have 
achieved, to varying degrees, a level of industrial 
and urban development which would make it 
both undesirable and impossible to make so radi-
cal a change in the course that the expansion of 
industry would cease to be the dynamic factor in 
the economy and society. The issue is not 
whether, but what kind of, industrial develop-
ment should take place. 
In this connection, a broad area of consensus 
has been emerging in Latin America which 
seems to offer a promising avenue for further 
reflection on the issue: the concept of "endogen-
ous industrialization".66 The reader should not 
be misled by the semantic similarity of this 
notion with that of "inward-oriented" indus-
trialization. Endogenous industrialization is 
indeed oriented towards the national economy, 
"The best analysis of this concept is found in Nerfin < 1977), a 
collection of pieces which explicitly reject the "fundamentalist", 
anti-industrial version of the approach. 
"Fajnzylber (1983); Villarreal (1984). 
sion that nothing short of a fundamental refor-
mulation of the present pattern of development 
seems to offer any hope of real progress. This 
raises questions concerning the type of reformu-
lation involved, its political pre-requisites and, 
ultimately, its political viability. 
but it does not entail blanket protectionism or 
autarkic goals. It essentially calls for the defini-
tion of industrialization policy in terms of the 
needs of the majority as well as in terms of the 
maximization of its internal linkages and mul-
tiplier effects. 
This means, first, that the pattern of indus-
trial capacity and output should be oriented 
towards satisfying the basic needs of the popula-
tion and, therefore, directed towards mass inter-
nal markets. For this to be viable, several closely 
linked requirements must be fulfilled: 
a) The structure of income distribution must 
be modified so as to contribute to the emergence 
of a mass market for wage goods. This not only 
calls for an income policy that is more egalitarian 
as it relates to industry, but also —as the analysis 
of the East Asian NICs has shown— for a reor-
ganization of economic and social power rela-
tions in the countryside. Agrarian reform, in the 
East Asian experience, was a central component 
in the process of generating a market for the 
goods produced by its nascent industry, while the 
growing productivity of the latter permitted the 
growth of real income in both industry and agri-
culture at the same time. 
b) Industrialization should emphasize 
labour-intensive production so that market 
demand will be created along with its output. It is 
also the case that the production of mass wage 
goods is, all else being equal, more labour inten-
sive than the production of luxury goods. This 
does not mean that productivity should be sacri-
ficed, but rather that productivity should be con-
ceived in terms of units of labour rather than 
units of capital or of output. This would also 
have the advantage of reducing foreign exchange 
requirements, which have constantly expanded 
IV 
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under the present model due to the technological 
costs entailed by the need both to satisfy the 
demand of the higher-income strata of the 
domestic market and to maintain international 
competitiveness in manufactured exports. 
c) Industrialization should also maximize 
the linkages within the national economy. This 
implies increasing the use of local inputs and 
adapting technology to that aim. A particularly 
promising area for industrial and technological 
development is the processing of natural resour-
ces, both agricultural and mining. The expe-
rience of other countries has shown that these 
industries can become dynamic poles for devel-
opment in general. Such industries could include 
the production of both intermediate inputs and 
capital goods, the latter being, as is well known, 
intensive in skilled labour. In this way, a multip-
lier learning effect can be set in motion. 
A fundamental component of the new model 
would be the relationship between industry and 
agriculture. It has already been emphasized that 
agrarian reform is a pre-requisite for "balanced 
development. Two points, however, need to be 
added. Firstly, the balance between agricultural 
production for the internal food market and for 
export crops has to be carefully defined. Food 
security should be a primary goal of agricultural 
policy in the new model, but this does not neces-
sarily entail food self-sufficiency. Rather, the 
basic feature of a food system which provides 
security is its capacity to make available an ade-
quate internal food supply through production, 
the management of reserves, and imports to 
meet the basic food needs of all social groups. 
Such a system is self-determined in that it min-
imizes vulnerability to international market 
fluctuations and political pressures; however, its 
aim is not autarky but rather dependability, 
while still taking advantage of the gains to be 
made from specialization.67 There is, therefore, a 
role for export agriculture in the new models, 
provided that it is conceived and organized in 
terms of the needs of the national economy and 
society (i.e., the provision of foreign exchange 
for essential imports) rather than of interna-
tional agribusiness or the domestic agrarian 
bourgeoisie. The second point to be made in 
connection with the relation between agriculture 
"United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
(UNRISD) (1986), pp. 2-3. 
and industry is the need to emphasize the estab-
lishment of rural industries. Again, the expe-
rience of the East Asian NICs is enlightening in 
this regard. Rural industries are more efficient in 
terms of the exploitation of local inputs, of 
labour intensiveness, of reducing the rural-urban 
migration phenomenon and of generating 
demand for manufactured products in the 
countryside. 
The economic viability of the model will 
depend on a careful management of foreign 
exchange. As regards the balance of trade, this 
will involve, firstly, the maintenance (and, if 
possible, the tightening) of restrictions on 
imports of consumer durables and luxury goods 
and the concentration of foreign exchange on 
imports which are necessary for economic activ-
ity (i.e., capital and intermediate goods, spare 
parts and raw materials). Secondly, it will entail 
an effort to expand exports, be they primary 
products, agricultural goods or manufactures. 
This evidently raises difficult problems concern-
ing the alternative uses of resources which can 
only be analysed in terms of each particular 
country's situation, but the issue is common to all 
cases. Equally, the need to reduce capital out-
flows —notably external debt service and capital 
flight— emerges as an inescapable common 
requirement. The debt aspect also raises com-
plex questions of international bargaining for all 
the countries concerned, as single-country 
attempts at obtaining meaningful relief have 
proven unsuccessful, while collective action has 
turned out to be just as elusive. 
On the question of market orientation and 
trade policies, this study has emphasized the 
spurious character of the dichotomy between 
import substitution and export promotion. 
What has been wrong is the indiscriminate and 
excessive protection given to finished manufac-
tured products, notably those for the higher-
income markets. Far from setting up a 
favourable environment for infant industries 
(one would be hard pressed to call the local 
subsidiary of a major automobile multinational 
an "infant"), this has created a veritable "rent-
ier" industry whose dynamic potential is very 
limited. By contrast, the East Asian NICs exem-
plify the kind of import substitution that entails 
a learning process, has export potential and 
must therefore be highly selective and purpose-
ful. In this way the East Asian NICs experience 
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further erodes the notion of static comparative 
advantage as a criterion for international spe-
cialization. Before the complex learning process 
represented by import substitution started, 
Korea had no comparative advantage in the steel 
and shipbuilding sectors; ten years later, it was a 
leading country in these sectors in the world 
market. Their experience also casts further 
doubt on the wisdom of the standard rejection of 
quantitative restrictions —as compared to tariffs 
and subsidies— in the choice of instruments of 
protection. As was stated in a recent assessment, 
"from the viewpoint of a government such as 
that of South Korea, which seems to have been 
concerned to encourage and, at times, coerce 
private firms to move into particular areas of 
production, one of the main advantages of using 
quantitative restrictions is that they provide the 
firms concerned with a greater degree of cer-
tainty regarding market size and hence sales and 
profitability than do tariffs (unless prohibitive) 
or subsidies".68 
The selective and directed form of protec-
tion which the alternative model would involve 
should be defined within the context of the pro-
motion of a meaningful process of regional and 
continental integration. This is, of course, an 
issue that goes beyond the area of external trade; 
there are powerful arguments of a broad eco-
nomic and political nature for recommending 
the path of Latin American integration. The 
point to be emphasized here, however, is the 
need to recapture the concept of regional inte-
gration as part of a genuine move towards con-
tinental development and independence. In this 
sense, the notion would acquire a fundamentally 
different connotation from the one it had in the 
1960s, when it emerged as a way out of the 
constraints which limited national markets were 
posing to the desarrollista model during the 
phase when it was oriented towards multina-
tional corporations. The new integration effort 
should go back to the philosophy that inspired 
the creation of the Andean Pact, rather than that 
of the Latin American Free Trade Association. 
There is a logical link between this last point 
and the next major question to be addressed in 
the formulation of an alternative model: the role 
of the State. The orthodox critique of the roles 
«Fransman (1984), p. 54. 
assumed by the State as regards intervention and 
accumulation, is greatly discredited by the failure 
of the orthodox option to generate development. 
On the other hand, a return to the desarrollista 
State in Latin America is no solution: the prob-
lems that it encountered and the contradictions 
that it generated in performing its role of sup-
porting private accumulation still obtain, in par-
ticular the virtual absence of a dynamic domestic 
entrepreneurial class capable of acting as the 
central agent of the process. Equally, the view 
that the Latin American countries can somehow 
reproduce the experience of the East Asian NICs 
and achieve rapid economic growth within a 
State-directed capitalist framework is refuted by 
the preceding comparison between the two 
cases. The Latin American States cannot benefit 
from the exceptional historical circumstances 
which contributed to the degree of autonomy 
enjoyed by the Korean and Taiwanese States 
vis-a-vis their own societies and which allowed 
them to pursue a path of accelerated capitalist 
development. The Latin American nations are 
already saddled with a structure of economic and 
political power which is fundamentally inimical 
to the development of their internal productive 
forces; at the same time, they cannot ignore the 
presence and the demands of the popular sec-
tors, particularly, but by no means solely, in 
those countries where processes of a return to 
civilian rule are taking place. An inclusionary 
model of development,69 which appears both 
economically and politically necessary, is at the 
same time unattainable without a fundamental 
change in the structure of power and in the very 
social fabric of the Latin American countries. 
Such a change would allow the State to assume 
the role of the central agent of growth, change 
and development, with grass-roots organization 
and participation also playing a crucial role in a 
way compatible with the management of a com-
plex industrial economy.70 
The role of the State in this model will be 
both to generate and to capture surpluses for 
accumulation. One lesson of the Latin American 
69For discussion of the concepts of inclusionary and exclu-
sionary models see O'Donnell < 1973) and Stepan (1978). 
"There is a rich debate on this issue, both at a general 
theoretical level and in reference to Latin America. See Bahro 
(1978) and (1982); Heller (1984); Portantiero (1981); Franco 
(1982); Bruna et. al. (1982). 
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experience is that the two main ways in which 
attempts have so far been made to generate 
investible surpluses are to be avoided. These are 
the "inflation tax" and foreign indebtedness. 
Both have accelerated the fiscal crisis while fail-
ing to raise the domestic ratio of productive 
investment. Clearly, this failure has not been due 
to a lack of capital resources in Latin America (as 
demonstrated by capital flight and speculation), 
but to an insufficient mobilization of these 
resources for domestic productive investment. 
To achieve this objective, the surpluses should be 
generated through: 1) domestic savings, which 
—as the examples of the East Asian NICs 
suggest— are not only compatible with, but 
indeed increased by, a more equal distribution of 
income; and 2) the setting up of an efficient 
capital market for whose successful operation, of 
course, inflation control is essential. 
2. The path to the alternative model: 
some problems 
This kind of alternative model faces several 
problems and obstacles. A matter of particular 
importance is the transition from the current 
situation to one in which the introduction of the 
alternative model can be realistically contem-
plated as a possibility. In making this transition, 
the role of the State will also be crucial, but 
equally problematic. In economies undergoing a 
crisis of accumulation, the question of the availa-
bility of the resources needed both to resume 
growth and to effect the major restructuring 
implied in the model is an open one. The prob-
lem of ensuring that the very legitimate 
demands of the popular sectors for an increase in 
their levels of consumption will be compatible 
with the need to generate investible surpluses 
appears particularly intractable. Yet, here again, 
the lesson to be learned from the East Asian 
experience is that both classical economies' 
obsession with sources of income and monetarist 
economics' preoccupation with absolute income 
levels as the determinant of savings and invest-
ment are misplaced. Similarly, the supposed 
identity between savings and investment postu-
lated by both versions of orthodox economics is 
refuted by the Latin American experience. As 
the East Asian cases show, in a context of rising 
popular income, a wider social spread in the 
composition of domestic savings can occur 
which, if properly channelled by the State, can be 
mobilized for productive domestic investment in 
a far more effective way than is made possible by 
the problematic mobilization of the large indi-
vidual savings of high-income recipients. State 
success in attracting voluntary savings and in 
generating and mobilizing a surplus will be cru-
cial for the overall success of the model, for the 
State will be called upon to step up the provision 
of housing, education, health and social security, 
as well as to oversee the satisfaction of the basic 
food needs of the population as a whole. A 
heightened popular demand for such benefits 
will thus renew the pressure on the fiscal budget 
which was characteristic of the 1970s and 1980s. 
More generally —and contrary to the 
orthodox prescription— the role of the State 
will have to be increased, not reduced. Yet it is 
clear that the type of State required to design and 
implement these policies is not easily found in 
contemporary Latin America. The resilience of 
anti-reformist political forces and the urgency of 
external pressures for adjustment seem to create 
an ¡deal combination for justifying austerity 
measures which, in turn, can only further post-
pone the implementation of inclusionary poli-
cies. Adjustment programmes based on price 
and wages controls —such as those introduced 
by the civilian governments in Argentina and 
Brazil— are only a temporary answer; price con-
trols cannot be maintained indefinitely, and in 
the absence of structural change, their release 
will bring a return of high inflation and, proba-
bly, of austerity policies that will cause wages to 
lag behind. Governments will thus find them-
selves the target of popular discontent. This may 
either strengthen the position of the proponents 
—within the State— of urgent and even radical 
social change, or lead to attempts at reviving the 
previous limited co-optation strategies of the 
populist State. 
The populist "temptation" continues to 
have a strong appeal for many contemporary 
Latin American governments caught in the web 
of the many contradictions they have inherited. 
There seems to be little room left, however, for 
populist strategies. This is due, on the one hand, 
to the labour-saving form of industrialization 
pursued, which in the EOJ stage has, further-
more, been closely geared to norms of interna-
tional competitiveness involving low industrial 
wages —a tendency which has been reinforced as 
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a consequence of the fiscal crisis. The limitations 
of industrial employment and the restrictions 
imposed on an expanding urban demand for 
manufactured goods, together with the curtail-
ing of welfare expenditures, create the least con-
genial setting for a return to populist solutions. 
On the other hand, any political strategy must 
take into account the re-emergence of the land 
issue within a context which is no longer charac-
terized by the backwardness of agriculture but by 
its export-oriented capitalization. The latter 
context is still inimical to an inclusionary model 
inasmuch as it leads to the concentration of land 
ownership and rural income, to an erosion of 
food security and to increases in the cost of wage 
goods. A populist strategy would be no more able 
than before to incorporate the radicalized 
demands of highly mobilized rural popular sec-
tors which are stilt articulated around the power-
ful symbol of land redistribution. To the 
contrary, any populist discourse would now be 
likely to invoke the argument of agricultural 
productivity to justify non-redistributive 
policies. 
Just as the policies which led to the crisis 
were based on excluding large sectors of society 
from sharing in national wealth and income, the 
orthodox recommendations for overcoming the 
crisis would maintain —or even reinforce— 
these same patterns of social exclusion. This 
represents a far greater long-term danger than 
the fiscal crisis. Attempts at revitalizing exclu-
sionary models of accumulation cannot succeed 
either economically or politically in a context of 
democratic politics involving highly mobilized 
popular sectors. They can only succeed in des-
troying the capacity of the régimes to consolidate 
their legitimacy based on a broad social consen-
sus that would bring in marginalized popular 
sectors. 
The central issue concerning the political 
viability of an alternative model of development 
is the key role that the popular sectors must play 
in a political coalition which could activate that 
model. Generalizations for the whole of the con-
tinent appear unwarranted here; there is no sub-
stitute for the detailed assessment of the political 
potentialities of each national situation. The 
diversity of the origins of the various popular 
sectors, of their composition, evolution and 
insertion in the different national contexts will 
be decisive in shaping the political strategies to 
be adopted. 
It should also be clear that, although the 
alternative project must be so designed as to 
command the support of a broad spectrum of the 
population, it is not a project of "national con-
sensus", since it entails opposing the interests of 
some specific sectors of society. In general, the 
capitalist class which has defined its interests in 
terms of an integration with international capi-
tal seems to have no place in the new model, 
unless it manages to redefine its role. In many 
countries, too, there will be traditional sectors 
linked to agrarian interests which will be forced 
to relinquish their hold over society and the 
economy. Speculative financial capital, which 
flourished under the "opening" mode in particu-
lar, will also feel threatened. 
By contrast, the new model should be able to 
incorporate the interests of those sectors of 
industrial capital having a genuine national 
vocation, which have by and large been harmed 
by the "opening" model. It should also receive 
support from the middle class of State managers, 
professionals and technical personnel. A broad 
inclusionary coalition of this sort —which, it 
must be emphasized, will have to be more pre-
cisely defined in each specific national context— 
should be able to form a sufficiently solid front to 
face what will, in all probability, be the opposi-
tion of international capital and the interna-
t iona l f inancial o r g a n i z a t i o n s , whose 
prescriptions for a yet wider opening of the 
economies and their integration into the world 
capitalist system will be directly contradicted by 
the new model. The support of some govern-
ments in the capitalist centre —the "like-
minded countries", in the terminology of 
international organizations— could be of great 
importance in this respect. 
To summarize, the contradictions of the new 
democratic State in Latin America stem from the 
need to promote an inclusionary development 
model (which requires stepping up the roles it 
plays in intervention and accumulation) in a 
hostile external economic environment and a 
structurally unbalanced and highly conflicting 
internal context involving increasing demands 
from the hitherto excluded sectors. Further-
more, this must be done in a way which minim-
izes the use of coercion, maximizes the 
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legitimizing role of participatory ideology and 
increases welfare activities. This is, no doubt, a 
formidable challenge. How well State structures 
and the leadership of the various components of 
potential inclusionary coalitions will respond to 
it remains an open question. 
Bibliographic references 
Adams, D.W. (1978): Mobilizing household savings through rural 
fiancial markets, Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, vol. 26, No. 3, April, pp. 547-60. 
Adelman, I. and Robinson, S. (1978): Income Distribution Policy 
in Developing Countries: A Case Study of Korea, Oxford 
University Press. 
Amsden, A. (1985): The State and Taiwan's Economic Develop-
ment, in Evans P.B., Rueschemeyer, D. and Skocpol, T. (eds.), 
Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 78-106. 
Anglade, C. and Fortin, C. (eds.) ( 1985) (vol. II, forthcoming), The 
State and Capital Accumulation in Latin America, vols. I and 
II, London: Macmitlan, and Pittsburgh: The University of 
Pittsburgh Press. 
Banco, R. (1978): The Alternative in Eastern Europe, London: 
New Left Books. 
(1982): Socialism and Survival, London: Heretic Press. 
Balassa, B. (1984): External shocks and policy responses in sub-
Saharan Africa, 1973-1978, Finance and Development, 
vol. 21, No. 1, March, pp. 10-12. 
(ed.) (1982): Development Strategies in Semi-industrial 
Economies, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Bruna, S. et al. (1982): América Latina: desarrollo y perspectivas 
democráticas, San José de Costa Rica: Ediciones FLACSO. 
Búsqueda (1986): No. 321, 27 February, Montevideo. 
Cline, W.R. (1982): Can the East Asian model of development be 
generalized?, World Development, vol. 10, No. 2, February, 
pp. 81-90. 
Coyuntura Económica (1984): vol. XIV, No. 3, Bogotá, October. 
(1985): vol. XV, No. 1, Bogotá, April. 
Crockett, A. (1982): Issues in the use of Fund resources, Finance 
and Development, vol. 19, No. 2, June, pp. 10-15. 
Dell, S. (1982): Stabilization: the political economy of overkill, 
World Development, vol. 10, No. 8, August, pp. 597-612. 
Dornbusch, R. (1982): Stabilization policies in developing coun-
tries: what have we learned?, World Development, vol. 10, 
No. 9, September, pp. 701-8. 
ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean) (1981) (1983) (1984): Statistical Yearbook for 
Latin America, Santiago, Chile, United Nations publications, 
Sales Nos.: S/E.83.H.G.1; S/E.84.I1.G.2; E/S.85.H-G.1, 
respectively. 
( 1986): America Latina y el Caribe: balance de pagos 1950-
19M (LC/G.1418), Cuadernos Estadísticos de la CEPAL, 
No. 10, Santiago, Chile. 
(1986a): Economie Survey of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 1985: Advance Summary (LC/G.1413 
(SES.21/8)), Santiago, Chile. 
-(1986b): Economic Development: An Appraisal, and 
Projections, 1985-1995 (LC/G. 1407(SES.21/9)),, Santiago, 
Chile, 6 March. 
Evans, D. and Alizadeh, P. ( 1984): Trade, industrialization and the 
visible hand, The Journl of Development Studies, vol. 21, 
No. I, October, pp. 22-46. 
Fajnzylber, F. ( 1981 ): Some reflections on South-East Asian export 
industrialization, CEPAL Review, No. 15 (E/ 
CEPAL/G.1187), Santiago, Chile, December, United 
Nations publication, Sales No.: E.81.II.G.4, pp. 111-132. 
(1983): La industrialización trunca de América Latina, 
Mexico City: Editorial Nueva Imagen. 
Fei, J.C.H., Ranis, G. and Kuo, S.W.Y. (1978): Growth and the 
family distribution of income by factor components, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, vol. 92, No. 1, February, pp. 17-
53. 
Fitzgerald, E.V.K. (1980): A note on capital accumulation in 
Mexico: the budget deficit and investment finance, Develop-
ment and Change, vol. 11, No. 3, July, pp. 391-417. 
(1983): The State and the Management of Accumulation in 
the Periphery, in Tussie,D. (éd.), Latin America in the World 
Economy: New Perspectives, London: Gower, pp. 111-23. 
Franco, C (1982): Los sujetos sociales y el movimiento para el 
socialismo, Socialismo y Participación, vol. V, No. 20, Lima, 
December, pp. 81-103-
Fransman, M. (1984): Explaining the success of the Asian NICs: 
incentives and technology, IDS Bulletin, vol. 15,No. 2,April, 
pp. 50-56. 
Furstenberg, G.M. and Malkiel, B.G. (1977): The Government 
and capital formation: A survey of recent issues, Journal of 
Economic Literature, vol. XV, No. 3,September, pp. 835-78. 
Hamilton, C. (1983): Capitalist industrialization in East Asia's 
Four Little Tigers, Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 13, 
No. 1, pp. 35-73. 
(1984): Class, State and industrialization in South Korea, 
IDS Bulletin, vol. 15, No. 2, April, pp. 38-43. 
Heller, A. ( 1984): A Radical Philosophy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Hirschman, A.O. (1971): A Bias for Hope, New Haven, Conn.: 
Yale University Press. 
Ho, S.P.S. (1971): The Development Policy of the Japanese 
Colonial Government in Taiwan, 1895-1945, in Ranis, G. 
(éd.), Government and Economic Development, New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, pp. 287-328. 
(1982): Economic development and rural industry in South 
Korea and Taiwan, World Development, vol. 10, No. 11, 
November, pp. 973-90. 
Hyun, K.N., Adams, D.W. and Hushak, L.J. (1979): Rural house-
hold savings behavior in South Korea, 1962-76, American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 61, No. 3, August, 
pp. 448-54. 
IDB (Inter-American Development Bank) (various issues): 
Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, Washington, 
DC. 
(1984a): External Debt and Economic Development in 
Latin America, Washington, D.C. 
(1984b) (1985) (1986): Economic and Social Progress in 
Latin America, Washington, D.C. 
Kelly, M. (1983): Fiscal deficits and Fund-supported programs, 
Finance and Development, vol. 20, No. 3, September, pp. 37-
39. 
Khan, M.S. and Knight, M. (1981): Stabilization programs in 
developing countries: a formal framework, International 
Monetary Fund Staff Papers, vol. 28,No. 1,March, pp. 1-53. 
Koo, A.Y.C. (1968): The Role of Land Reform in Economic Devel-
opment - A Case Study of Taiwan, New York: Praeger. 
Koo, H. (1984): The political economy of income distribution in 
South Korea: the impact of the State's industrialization poli-
cies, World Development, vol. 12,No. 10, October, pp. 1029-
37. 
234 CEPAL REVIEW No. 31 / April 1987 
Krueger, A.O. (1984): Comparative Advantage and Development 
Policy Twenty Years Later, in Syrquin, M., Taylor, L. and 
Westphal, L. (eds.), Economic Structure and Performance: 
Essays in Honor of Hollis B. Chenery, New York: Academic 
Press, pp. 135-56. 
Kuo, S.W.Y. (1984): Urbanization and Income Distribution: The 
Case of Taiwan, 1966-80, in Syrquin, M., Taylor, L. and 
Westphal, I., (eds.), Economic Structure and Performance: 
Essays in Honor of Hollis B. Chenery, New York: Academic 
Press, pp. 217-34. 
Kuznets, P.W. (1977): Economic Growth and Structure in the 
Republic of Korea, New Haven, G>nn.: Yale University 
Press. 
Lahera, E. (1985): The transnational corporations and Latin 
America's international trade, CEPAL Review, No. 25 
(LC/G.1338), Santiago, Chile, United Nations publication, 
Sales No.: E.85.II.G.2, pp. 45-65. 
Little, I.M.D. ( 1982): Economic Development: Theory, Policy and 
International Relations, New York: Basic Books. 
Luedde-Neurath, R. (1984): State intervention and foreign direct 
investment in South Korea, IDS Bulletin, vol. !5, No. 2, 
April, pp. 18-25. 
Moore, M. (1984): Agriculture in Taiwan and South Korea: the 
minimalist state?, IDS Bulletin, vol. 15, No. 2, April, pp. 57-
64. 
Nerfin, M. (ed.) (1977): Another Development: Approaches and 
Strategies, Uppsala: The Dag Hammarskjold Foundation. 
OAS (Organization of American States) (1984): Short-Term 
liconomic Reports, vol. IX, Bolivia (Washington, D.C.). 
O'Connor, J. (1973): The Fiscal Crisis of the Stale, New York: 
St. Martin's Press. 
O'Donnell, G. (1973): Modernization and Bureaucratic-
Authoritarianism: Studies on South American Politics, Ber-
keley: University of California, Institute of International Stu-
dies, Politics of Modernization Series, No. 9. 
OECD Economic Outlook (1984): No. 36, Paris, December. 
Ong, M.L., Adams, D.W. and Singh, I.J. (1976): Voluntary rural 
savings capacities in Taiwan, 1960-70, American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, vol. 58, No. 3, August, pp. 578-82. 
Paukert, F., Skolka, J. and Maton.J. (1981): Income Distribution, 
Structure of Economy and Employment - The Philippines, 
Iran, the Republic of Korea and Malaysia, London: Groom 
Helm. 
Pinto, A. (1980): The opening up of Latin America to the exterior, 
CEPAL Review, No. 11 (E/CEPAL/G.1133), Santiago, 
Chile, United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.80.II.G.3, 
pp. 31-56. 
Portantiero, J.C. (1981): El socialismo como construcción de un 
orden político democrático, Socialismo y Participación, 
vol. IV, No. 15, Lima, September, pp. 63-72. 
Ranis, G. (1978): Equity with growth in Taiwan: how "special" is 
the "special case"?, World Development, vol. 6, No. 3, 
March, pp. 397-409. 
Ranis, G. and L Orrock (1985): Latin American and East Asian 
NICs: Development Strategies Compared, in Duran, E. (ed.), 
Latin America and the World Recession, London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs and Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 48-68. 
Rao, D.C (1978): Economic growth and equity in the Republic of 
Korea, World Development, vol. 6, No. 3, March, pp. 383-
96. 
Ro, Y.K., Adams, D.W. and Hushak, L.J. (1981): Income instability 
and consumption-savings in South Korean farm households, 
1965-1970, World Development, vol.9, No. 2, February, 
pp. 183-91. 
Roemer, M. (1981): Dependence and industrialization strategies, 
World Development, vol. 9, No. 5, May, pp. 429-34. 
Schmitz, H. (1984): Industrialization strategies in less developed 
countries: some lessons of historical experience, The Journal 
of Development Studies, vol. 21, No. 1, October, pp. 1-21. 
Sharpley, J. (1984): The Potential of Domestic Stabilization 
Measures in Developing Countries, in Killick, T. (ed.), The 
Quest far Economic Stabilization: the IMF and the Third 
World, London: Heinemann Educational Books in associa-
tion with the Overseas Development Institute, pp. 55-85. 
Stepan, A. (1978): The State and Society: Peru in Comparative 
Perspective, Princeton University Press. 
Tanzi, V. (1982): Fiscal Disequilibrium in developing countries, 
World Development, vol. 10, No. 12, December, pp. 1069-
82. 
Tobin, J. and Buiter, W. (1980): Fiscal and Monetary Policies, 
Capital Formation and Economic Activity, in Furstenberg, 
G.M. (ed.), The Government and Capital Formation, Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, pp. 73-151. 
Tseng, W. (1984): The effects of adjustment, Finance and Devel-
opment, vol. 21, No. 4, December, pp. 2-5. 
UNRISD (United Nations Research Institute for Social Develop-
ment) (1986): "Food Systems and Society": Problems of Food 
Security in Selective Developing Countries. A Draft Over-
view Report, Geneva, March. 
Villarreal, R. (1984): La estrategia de industrialización y comercio 
exterior en América Latina, Economía de América Latina, 
No. 12, Mexico, 2nd semester, pp. 33-51. 
Wade, R. (1984): Dirigisme Taiwan-style, IDS Bulletin, vol. 15, 
No. 2, April, pp. 65-71. 
Westphal, L.E. (1978): The Republic of Korea's experience with 
export-led industrial development, World Development, 
vol. 6, No. 3, March, pp. 347-82. 
Wiesner, E. (1985): Domestic and external causes of the Latin 
American debt crisis, Finance and Development, vol. 22, 
No. 1, March, pp. 24-6. 
World Financial Markets (1983): June. 
(1985a): February. 
(1985b): May. 
——(1985c): September-October. 
(1986a): February. 
(1986b): March. 
